Constitutional Law - Confrontation Clause - Unavailability of Out-of-Court Declarant by McGrady, John E., III
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 31 Number 1 Article 10 
1992 
Constitutional Law - Confrontation Clause - Unavailability of Out-
of-Court Declarant 
John E. McGrady III 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John E. McGrady III, Constitutional Law - Confrontation Clause - Unavailability of Out-of-Court Declarant, 
31 Duq. L. Rev. 209 (1992). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol31/iss1/10 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONFRONTATION CLAUSE-UNAVAILABILITY
OF OUT-OF-COURT DECLARANT-The United States Supreme Court
held the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution does
not require that the prosecution either produce the declarant at
trial or the trial court find the declarant unavailable before testi-
mony may be admitted under the spontaneous declaration or med-
ical examination exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Randall D. White v Illinois, - US - , 112 S Ct 736 (1992).
Randall D. White (hereinafter "Petitioner") was convicted in the
State of Illinois of aggravated criminal sexual assault, residential
burglary, and unlawful restraint.1 The victim of the sexual assault
and unlawful restraint was a four year old girl referred to by the
Court only as S.G..2 Testimony at the trial indicated that on April
16, 1988, S.G.'s babysitter was awakened by S.G.'s scream.3 The
babysitter went to S.G.'s bedroom and witnessed the Petitioner
leaving the room and subsequently exiting the house.4 Upon in-
quiry S.G. stated to the babysitter that the petitioner had placed
his hand over her mouth, choked her, and threatened to whip her
if she screamed.5 S.G. also indicated that she had been touched in
the vaginal area.' Similar statements were made by S.G. to her
mother, investigating police officer, and the attending emergency
room nurse and physician.' The State of Illinois (hereinafter
1. White v Illinois, - US - , 112 S Ct 736, 739 (1992). Aggravated criminal
sexual assault is a Class X felony under Ill Rev Stat ch 38, § 12-14(c) (1987). People v.
White, 198 Ill App 3d 641, 555 NE2d 1241, 1256 (1990). It is a non-probationable offense
that carries a possible prison sentence of not less than 6 years nor more than 30 years pursu-
ant to Ill Rev Stat ch 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(3) (1987). White, 555 NE2d at 1256. Residential
burglary is a Class 1 felony under Ill Rev Stat ch 38, § 19-3(b) (1987). Id. It carries a possi-
ble prison sentence of not less than 4 years and not more than 15 years pursuant to Ill Rev
Stat ch 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(4)( 1987). Id. Unlawful restraint is a Class 4 felony under Ill Rev
Stat ch 38, § 10-3(b) (1987). Id: It carries a possible prison sentence of not less than 1 year
nor more than 3 years pursuant to Ill Rev Stat ch 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(7) (1987). Id. The peti-
tioner was sentenced to concurrent 10 year, 6 year and 2 year prison terms. Id.





7. S.G.'s statements were made to her mother approximately 30 minutes after the
incident; statements to the police officer were made approximately 45 minutes after the
incident; statements to the attending medical personnel were made approximately 4 hours
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"State") attempted to have S.G. testify at trial, but due to emo-
tional difficulties S.G. did not testify.8 The Petitioner did not at-
tempt to call S.G. as a witness.' Furthermore, the trial court did
not make, nor was it asked to make, a finding that S.G. was un-
available to testify.
10
The Petitioner objected on hearsay grounds to the admission of
the testimony of the babysitter, S.G's mother, the police officer,
and the nurse and physician regarding S.G.'s out-of-court state-
ments describing the alleged sexual assault." The trial court over-
ruled the Petitioner's objection.' 2 The testimony of the babysitter,
S.G.'s mother and the police officer was permitted pursuant to the
Illinois hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations.' 3 The testi-
mony of the nurse and physician was permitted under the sponta-
neous declaration exception as well as an exception for statements
made in the course of securing medical treatment (hereinafter
"medical examination" exception).14 The trial court also denied
the Petitioner's motion for a mistrial based on S.G.'s presence at
trial and failure to testify."
The Petitioner was found guilty by a jury in the trial court, and
the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction. 6 The ap-
pellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
afforded it under state law in ruling that the testimony of the out-
of-court statements of S.G. qualified for admission under the spon-
taneous declaration or medical examination exceptions to the hear-
after the incident. Id.
8. The State made two separate attempts to call S.G. as a witness, however, in both
instances she did not testify. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id at 739-40.
12. Id at 740.
13: Id. The Illinois common law spontaneous declaration exception applies to "[a]
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." Id at 740 n 1, citing White, 555
NE2d at 1246.
14. White, 112 S Ct at 740. Ill Rev Stat ch 38, § 115-13 provides:
In a prosecution for violation of Section 12-13, 12-14, or 12-16 of the 'Criminal Code
of 1961', statements made by the victim to medical personnel for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment including descriptions of the cause of symptom, pain or sensa-
tions, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall be admitted as an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule.
Id at 740 n2, citing Ill Rev Stat 38, § 115-13 (1989).
15. White, 112 S Ct at 740.
16. Id. See note 1.
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say rule. 17 The appellate court also rejected the Petitioner's Con-
frontation Clause argument based principally on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v Roberts."8 The appellate court,
citing the Supreme Court's decision in United States v Inadi,19 did
not believe that as a antecedent to the introduction of hearsay tes-
timony the prosecution must either produce the declarant at trial
or show that the declarant is unavailable.20 The Illinois Supreme
Court denied discretionary review and the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari2 limited to the constitutional question of
whether the Petitioner's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
rights were violated by permitting the challenged testimony.2
17. Id at 740. In his appeal, the petitioner argued that S.G.'s statements to S.G.'s
mother, police officer, and nurse and physician were not spontaneous declarations because
S.G. had "calmed down" and was no longer reacting to the startling occurrence. White, 555
NE2d at 1248-49.
Additionally, the petitioner argued that S.G.'s statements to the attending nurse and phy-
sician did not fall within the exception for statements made in the course of securing medi-
cal treatment. Id at 1251. The petitioner argued that the treating medical personnel may
testify about a patient's statements concerning presently existing bodily conditions, but may
not relate the patient's statements which concern details of the alleged offense. Id.
The appellate court found the petitioner's argument unpersuasive noting that S.G. had
neither the time nor opportunity to fabricate the statements. Id at 1249-50. Additionally,
the appellate court recognized that it is unlikely that a child of tender years will have any
reason to fabricate stories of sexual abuse. Id. For a more comprehensive list of the factors
the appellate court considered in regards to the trial courts discretion, see White, 555 NE2d
at 1246-1251. The appellate court also concluded that Ill Rev Stat ch 38, § 115-13 was
designed to remove the restraints imposed by prior case law concerning the ability of a
physician to testify about what his patient told the physician for purposes of medical diag-
nosis or treatment. Id at 1251.
18. White, 112 S Ct at 740. The petitioner, citing Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56 (1980),
argued that:
[E]ven where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the prosecu-
tion still must either produce the declarant for cross-examination or demonstrate that
he is unavailable. . . . Since the prosecution neither produced the declarant [S.G.]
for cross-examination nor established that she was unavailable, [the petitioner] was
denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.
White, 555 NE2d at 1251.
The appellate court noted that the petitioner failed to cite or discuss United States v
Inadi, 475 US 387 (1986) or People v Ingram, 162 Ill App 3d 257, 515 NE2d 1252, two
decisions which analyzed Roberts. Id.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to. .. be confronted with the witnesses against him ... "US
Const, Amend VI.
19. 475 US 387 (1986).
20. White, 112 S Ct at 740.
21. White v Illinois, 111 S Ct 1681 (1991).
22. White, 112 S Ct at 740. For the purpose of the U.S. Supreme Court's discretion-
ary review of this case, the Court has taken as a given that the challenged testimony prop-
erly falls within the relevant hearsay exceptions. Id.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, 23 began his anal-
ysis by identifying the primary question under consideration:
whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution requires that, before a trial court ad-
mits testimony under the spontaneous declaration and medical ex-
amination exceptions to the hearsay rule, the prosecution must ei-
ther produce the declarant at trial or the trial court must find that
the declarant is unavailable.24 As a preliminary matter the Court
considered an argument urged by the United States as amicus cu-
riae in support of the State.2 5 The United States contended that
the Confrontation Clause's limited purpose is to prevent prosecut-
ing a defendant through the presentation of ex parte affidavits
without the affiants ever being produced at trial.26 It was argued
that because S.G.'s out-of-court statements do not fit this descrip-
tion, S.G. was not a witness against the Petitioner within the
meaning of the Confrontation Clause. 2' The Court, however, be-
lieved that such a narrow reading of the Confrontation Clause
would virtually eliminate its rule in restricting the admissions of
hearsay testimony and that such an argument is foreclosed by
prior cases.28 The Court further stated that the argument posed by
23. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
White, Blackman, Stevens, O'Conner, Kennedy, and Souter joined. Justices Scalia and
Thomas joined except for the discussion rejecting the United States' proposed reading of
the "witness against" Confrontation Clause phrase. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgement, in which Justice Scalia joined. Id at 738-739.
24. Id at 739.
25. Id at 740.
26. Id.
27. Id at 740-41. The United States argued that the Confrontation Clause is generally
inapplicable to the introduction of out-of-court statements admitted under accepted hearsay
exceptions. Id. Under this position the Confrontation Clause would only apply to a hearsay
exception where the statement sought to be admitted was in the character of an ex parte
affidavit, i.e. under circumstances suggesting that the statement was made for the principal
purpose of accusing or incriminating the defendant. Id at 741.
28. Id at 741. The Court pointed out that, citing Idaho v Wright, 497 US 805 (1990),
they have been careful not to equate the Confrontation Clause's prohibitions with-the gen-
eral rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay statements. Id at 741. Rather the Court rea-
soned that they have consistently sought to steer a middle course which recognizes that the
purposes of the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules are to protect similar values. Id at
741 citing Roberts 448 US at 68 n 9, and California v Green, 399 US 149, 155 (1970). The
Court also distinguished Mattox v United States, 156 US 237 (1895), upon which the
United States relied, indicating that the admittance of testimony in that case was based on
a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception and not because the hearsay testimony was unlike an ex
parte affidavit. Id at 741.
The Court also recognized that the United States' position has been previously considered
by the Court and has only gained the support of one Justice. Id citing Dutton v Evans, 400
US 74, 93 (1970) (Harlan concurring).
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the United States came too late in the day to warrant
reexamination.2
The Court then turned to the Petitioner's principal contention
that before a trial court admits testimony under the spontaneous
declaration" and medical examination exceptions to the hearsay
rule, the prosection must either produce the declarant at trial or
find that the declarant is unavailable.3 2 The Court, however, was of
the opinion that such an expansive reading of the Confrontation
Clause is negated by their decision in Inadi3 3 The Court in Inadi
refused to extend the unavailability requirement established in
Roberts to all out-of-court statements admitted under a hearsay
exception." Roberts stands for the proposition that an unavailabil-
ity analysis is a necessary part of the confrontation inquiry only
29. Id at 741.
30. See note 12.
31. See note 13.
32. White, 112 S Ct at 741. The petitioner's argument is based on the Court's holding
in Ohio v Roberts 448 US 56 (1980), where the Court considered a Confrontation Clause
challenge to the introduction of a transcript containing testimony from a probable-cause
hearing. Id. The transcript included testimony of a witness not produced at trial but who
had been subject to examination by the defendant's counsel at the probable-cause hearing.
Id. The Court recognized that the language they used in rejecting the Confrontation Clause
claim might suggest that the Confrontation Clause generally requires either that the declar-
ant be produced at trial or be found unavailable before his out of court statement be admit-
ted. Id.
33. Id at 741, citing United States v Inadi, 475 US 387 (1986). In Inadi the Court
considered the admission of out-of-court statements made by a co-conspirator in the course
of a conspiracy. Id at 741. The Court rejected the proposition that Roberts established a rule
requiring an out-of-court statement would not be admitted without a showing of unavaila-
bility of the declarant. Id, citing Roberts, 475 US at 392. Rather, the Court concluded that
Roberts "must be read consistently with the question it answered, the authority it cited, and
its own facts." Id, citing Roberts, 475 US at 394. Therefore, the Court concluded that Rob-
erts stands for the proposition that an unavailability analysis is a necessary consideration
within a Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the out-of-court statements were made
during a prior judicial proceeding. Id, citing Roberts, 475 US at 394.
34. White, 112 S Ct at 741-42. The Courts decision in Inadi rested on two factors. Id
at 742. First, co-conspirator statements, unlike former in-court testimony, provide evidence
of the conspiracy's context which cannot be duplicated even if the declarant testifies in
court as to the same matter. Id at 742, citing Inadi, 475 US at 395. Furthermore, considering
the declarant's likely change in status at the time of the trial, such testimony would not
contain the full evidentiary significance that would flow from statements made during the
course of the conspiracy. Id, citing Inadi, 475 US at 395. Secondly, the Court stated that
little benefit would be derived from imposing an "unavailability rule" in that such a rule
would not impose an absolute bar to the introduction of out-of-court statements and, there-
fore, would do little to improve the accuracy of fact finding while imposing substantial bur-
dens on the fact finding process. Id at 742, citing Inadi, 475 US at 396-98.
The "unavailability rule" means a rule that requires as an antecedent to introducing hear-
say testimony either a showing of the declarant's unavailability or producing the declarant
at trial. White, 112 S Ct at 742 n 6.
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when the challenged out-of-court statements of the declarant were
made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding. 5 Although Inadi
was considered in the context of evaluating co-conspirator state-
ments, it was the Court's opinion that such statements applied in
full force to the case at hand. 6 The exceptions here in question
provide substantial guarantees of trustworthiness that cannot be
recaptured with in-court testimony.3 7 The Court did not believe
the same could be said about the challenged statements in Roberts
where there was no threat of lost evidentiary value if the out-of-
court statements were replaced with in-court testimony of the de-
clarant. 8 The Court emphasized the evidentiary importance of
cross-examination but continued, however, to state that the Con-
frontation Clause is satisfied where proffered hearsay testimony
has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly
rooted exception to the hearsay rule.39
In summary, the Court reasoned that the out-of-court state-
ments in this case had substantial probative value that could not
be duplicated merely through the declarant's in-court testimony; °
that the basic purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to promote
the integrity of the fact finding process;41 that statements qualify-
ing for admission under firmly rooted hearsay exceptions are so
trustworthy that adversarial testing is unlikely to add to their reli-
ability;42 and that establishing a generally applicable unavailability
rule would have few practical benefits while imposing pointless liti-
gation.4 3 The Court reasoned that the out-of-court statements in
this case should not be afforded any different treatment from -the
statements in Inadi in that neither Inadi or Roberts provided a
basis for excluding the out-of-court statements under the aegis of
the Confrontation Clause with regard to evidence admitted under
the hearsay exceptions of spontaneous declarations and medical
35. Id at 741, citing Roberts, 475 at 394.
36. Id at 742.
37. Id. The Court cited Idaho v Wright, 497 US 805 (1990), and Bourjaily v United
States, 483 US 171 (1987), noting that "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions carry sufficient
indicia of reliability to satisfy the reliability requirement posed by the Confrontation
Clause. Id at 742 n 8.
38. Id at 743.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id, citing Coy v Iowa, 487 US 1012 (1988)(quoting Kentucky v Stincer, 483 US
730 (1987)).
42. Id at 743, citing Wright, 497 US 805 (cited in note 28).




In a second line of argument the Petitioner contended that hear-
say testimony offered by a child should be permitted only upon a
showing of necessity to protect the child's physical and psychologi-
cal well being. 45 In Coy v Iowa4 and Maryland v Craig47 the Court
addressed the question of what in-court procedures are constitu-
tionally required to guarantee a defendant's confrontation right
once a witness is testifying.48 The Court distinguished Coy and
Craig from the case at hand recognizing that they did not address
the question of what requirements the Confrontation Clause im-
poses as a predicate to the introduction of out-of-court declara-
tions.4'9 Here the Court found that there was no basis for importing
the necessity requirement announced in Coy and Craig to those
cases dealing with the admission of out-of-court statements under
established exceptions to the hearsay rule. 0
Based upon the Court's foregoing analysis, the judgment of the
Illinois Appellate Court was affirmed.5
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joined, filed an opin-
ion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.2 Justice
Thomas argued that the Court's assumption that all hearsay decla-
rations are witnesses against the defendant is not warranted by
history or the text of the Confrontation Clause. 3 Rather, Justice
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Coy v Iowa, 487 US 1012 (1988). In Coy the Court considered whether the peti-
tioners Sixth Amendment rights were violated by allowing two child witnesses to testify
from behind a screen which blocked the petitioner from their sight. Coy, 487 US at 1014.
The Court held that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the petitioner a face-to-face meet-
ing with the witnesses appearing against him, and that the petitioner's Sixth Amendment
rights were violated since there was no showing that the witnesses needed special protection.
Id at 1014-22.
47. Maryland v Craig, US __, 110 S Ct 3157 (1990). In Craig the Court con-
sidered whether the petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights were violated when a child witness
testified against the petitioner, outside his presence, via closed circuit television. Craig, 110
S Ct at 3160. The Court recognized that actual face to face encounter is not necessary at
every trial and concluded that the State's interest in protecting the physical and psychologi-
cal well-being of a child abuse victim provides an adequate showing of necessity to outweigh
the petitioner's right to face the witness in court. Id at 3162-71.
48. White, 112 S Ct at 743-44.




53. Id. Justice Thomas argued that the interpretation urged by the United States' as
amicus curiae was more consistent with the text and history of the Confrontation Clause
than the Court's current jurisprudence. Id at 747.
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Thomas urged that a narrow reading should be given to the phrase
witnesses against whereby the "federal constitutional right of con-
frontation extends to any witness who actually testifies at trial, but
the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements
only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial mater-
ials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confes-
sions."'' Such an interpretation would avoid the problem posed by
the Court's focus on hearsay exceptions that are "firmly rooted" in
the common law.65
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,
adopted in 1787, provides in part that "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with
the witness against him. .. ."" The primary purpose of this con-
stitutional provision, known as the Confrontation Clause, has been
construed to prevent the use of depositions and ex parte affidavits
against a defendant without requiring the witness to be produced
at trial.5 7 Although the specific language of the Confrontation
Clause does not appear to allow for exceptions, it has been inter-
preted to allow for the introduction of some evidence under certain
hearsay exceptions.
In Mattox v United States5" the petitioner alleged, inter alia,
that the court below erred in admitting into evidence the reporter's
notes of the testimony of two witnesses from the former trial.5 9
Both witnesses were present and subject to cross-examination at
the former trial, but had subsequently died prior to the second
trial." The petitioner argued that his Sixth Amendment right to
be confronted with the witnesses against him was infringed by the
admission of such testimony.61 In responding to the petitioner's ar-
54. Id.
55. Id at 748. Justice Thomas reasoned that his approach would be consistent with
the majority of the Supreme Court's cases because virtually all the cases decided before
Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56 (1980), involved prior testimony or confessions (such formalized
testimony being a primary focus of the Confrontation Clause). Id at 747-48.
56. US Const, Amend VI.
57. Mattox, 156 US at 242. In Mattox the Court pointed out that the primary objec-
tive of the Confrontation Clause "was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits ... be-
ing used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and
shifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the
jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the
manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief." Id at 242-43.
58. 156 US 237 (1895).
59. Id at 238.




gument the Court first noted that in both England and the United
States the majority of courts recognize that testimony of a de-
ceased or unavailable witness 'is admissible provided the right of
cross-examination had been exercised. 2 Under such circumstances
the Court believed it would work no hardship upon the defendant
to allow the testimony of the deceased to be read into evidence.6 s
The Court also pointed out, as it did in Reynolds v United
States," "that if the witness is absent by the procurement or con-
nivance of the defendant himself, he is in no condition to assert his
constitutional immunity."65 The Court was of the opinion that gen-
eral rules of law must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policy and necessity, and that to allow a criminal to go free
simply because of the death of a witness would be carrying the
constitutional protection to an unwarrantable extent.66 Therefore,
the Court concluded that the introduction of an authenticated
stenographic report containing former testimony of a deceased wit-
ness was competent evidence in light of the facts of the case." Also
recognized by the Court was that many of the Constitution's provi-
sions in the nature of the Bill of Rights are subject to exceptions,
recognized long before the adoption of the Constitution, and not
62. Id at 240-241. Specifically the Court stated:
The idea that this cannot be done seems to have arisen from a misinterpretation of a
ruling in the Case of Sir John Fenwick, 13 Howell's State Trials, 537, 579 et seq.,
which was a proceeding in Parliament in 1696 by bill of attainder upon a charge of
high treason. It appeared that Lady Fenwick had spirited away a material witness,
who had sworn against one Cook on his trial for the same treason. His testimony
having been ruled out, obviously because it was not the case of a deceased witness,
nor one where there had been an opportunity for cross-examination on a former trial
between the same parties, the case is nevertheless cited by Peake in his work on
Evidence (p. 90) as authority for the proposition that the testimony of a deceased
witness cannot be used in a criminal prosecution. The rule in England, however, is
clearly the other way. Buller's N.P. 242; King v Jolliffe, 4 TR 285, 290; King v
Radbourne, 1 Leach Cr Law 457; Rex v Smith, 2 Starkie 208; Buckworth's case, T
Raym 170. As to the practice in this country, we know of none of the States in which
such testimony is now held to be inadmissible.
63. Id at 242.
64. Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145 (1878). In Reynolds the petitioner alleged,
among others, that the admission of testimony by his wife at a former trial was a violation
of his Sixth Amendment rights. Evidence indicated that the petitioner assisted in prevent-
ing the prosecution from obtaining the wife's presence at the trial. The Court held that
when absence of the witness is obtained by the petitioner's own procurement and evidence
is supplied in some lawful way, the petitioner is in no condition to assert that his constitu-
tional rights have been violated.
65. Mattox, 156 US at 242.
66. Id at 243.
67. Id at 244.
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interfering with its spirit.68
For the next seventy years, Confrontation Clause challenges
were predominately limited to cases involving prior or former testi-
mony. Emphasis in these cases has primarily addressed the impor-
tance of cross-examination and personal presence of the witness at
trial."' However, in 1965, the Supreme Court held, in Pointer v
Texas,7" that the Confrontation Clause was applicable to the
States. 1 In Pointer the Court held that the Sixth Amendment's
right of an accused to confront the witness against him is a funda-
mental right made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth
68. Id. In dictum, the Court also stated that the introduction of evidence under the
dying declaration hearsay exception would not violate the Confrontation Clause. Id at 243-
44. The Court recognized that some exceptions arise simply from necessities of the case and
the need to prevent the manifest failure of justice. Id.
69. McCormick on Evidence provides the following analysis:
The right of cross-examination as evolved at common law has generally been
thought to be fulfilled by affording an opportunity to cross-examine; cross-examina-
tion need not in fact take place (citation omitted). Under the confrontation clause,
the matter has been further refined. If the former testimony was given at an earlier
full trial of the same case and is now offered at a retrial in place of the live testimony
of the witness, who has become unavailable, mere opportunity without actual cross-
examination probably suffices (citation omitted). However, if the former testimony
was given on an occasion other than a full trial, commonly a preliminary hearing,
concern focuses on whether cross-examination did in fact take place and whether it
was the "equivalent of significant cross-examination (citation omitted)."
Under the confrontation clause, as under the hearsay rule (citation omitted), un-
availability of the witness is a condition precedent to the admissibility of former tes-
timony (citation omitted). Since the fact that the witness is unavailable at the time of
trial lends no added weight or credibility to his former testimony, it is apparent the
requirement of unavailability is a means of effecting a policy of preferring the testi-
mony of the witness in person at the trial over a presentation of his testimony as
given on the former occasion. However, if the cross-examination requirement dis-
cussed above has been satisfied, use of the former testimony will not violate the con-
frontation clause if the witness is shown to be unavailable. Hence the confrontation
cases have devoted considerable attention to what constitutes unavailability.
Edward W. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence at 751, (West Publishing Co., 3rd, 1984).
70. Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400 (1965).
71. Id at 403. In Pointer the petitioner was arrested and brought before the state
court for a preliminary hearing on a robbery charge. Id at 401. The alleged victim testified
against the petitioner who was not represented by counsel and who did not cross-examine
the witness. Id. The petitioner was indicted and tried. Id. The witness having moved out of
state did not attend the trial, however, his testimony from the preliminary hearing was ad-
mitted. Id at 402. The Court held that the petitioner's Sixth Amendment guarantee of con-
frontation was denied because the witness's statements were not given under circumstances
affording the petitioner, through counsel, an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
ness. Id at 406-07. Here again, the Court recognized that the major reason underlying the
Confrontation Clause is to give a defendant charged with a crime an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness against him, citing Dowdell v United States, 221 US 325 (1911); Motes
v United States, 178 US 458 (1900); Kirby v United States, 174 US 47 (1899); and Mattox v
United States, 156 US 237 (1895). Id.
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Amendment.72 This decision opened the avenue for a significant
increase in the number of confrontation clause challenges which
would eventually lead to conflict with the ever expanding list of
hearsay exceptions.
In 1970, the Court in California v Green73 permitted the sub-
stantive use of prior inconsistent out-of-court statements, where
the witness testifies at trial, to be used for the truth of the matter
asserted 4.7  Additionally, the Court considered whether a witness's
prior inconsistent testimony given at a preliminary hearing could
be introduced for its truth when the witness testified at the trial. 5
The Court did not believe the Confrontation Clause was violated
by admitting a declarant's prior inconsistent out-of-court state-
ments provided the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject
to full and effective cross-examination.7 6 This conclusion was sup-
ported by a comparison of the purpose of the Confrontation Clause
to the potential dangers of admitting an out-of-court statement.
The Court stated:
Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his statements under
oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding
against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the wit-
ness to submit to cross-examination, the "greatest legal engine ever in-
vented for the discovery of truth"77 ; (3) permits the jury that is to decide
the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his
statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility."8
Although the out-of-court statement may not have been made
under conditions subject to the above protections, the Court be-
lieved that if the declarant was present and testifying at the trial
the out-of-court statement regained most of the lost protections. 9
72. Id at 403.
73. 399 US 149 (1970).
74. Id at 153-64. Section 1235 of the California Evidence Code, effective January 1,
1967, provided that evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by
the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with the witnesses testimony at the hearing
and is offered in compliance with Section 770 of the Code. Id. Section 770 of the California
Evidence Code requires that the witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny the
prior statement at some point in the trial. Id, see n 1. The Court noted that California's
codification of the prior inconsistent statement hearsay exception represents a minority
view in that it allows the statement to be used for the truth of the matter asserted. Id at
154. The majority view would only allow the statements to be introduced under appropriate
limiting instruction to impeach the credibility of the witness. Id.
75. Id at 165-68.
76. Id at 157-58.
77. Id at 158, citing 5 Wigmore § 1367.




Furthermore, the Court was of the opinion that the inability to
cross-examine the witness at the time of his prior statement was
not of crucial significance provided that petitioner was assured full
and effective cross-examination at the time of trial.8 0 Finally, the
Court recognized that none of its previous decisions interpreting
the Confrontation Clause required exclusion of out-of-court state-
ments of a witness who is available and testifying at trial;s' the
majority of cases addressed the exact opposite situation where
statements had been admitted for the truth under a recognized
hearsay exception and the declarant was not available for cross-
examination. 2 The Court concluded that the Confrontation Clause
is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-of-court statements
as long as he is testifying as a witness at trial and subject to full
cross-examination.
8 3
In addressing the introduction of the preliminary hearing testi-
mony, the Court reasoned that such testimony was admissible re-
gardless of the petitioner's opportunity to confront the witness at
the subsequent trial.84 Here the Court recognized that the witness
testified under oath; the petitioner was represented by counsel; the
petitioner had every opportunity to cross-examine the witness; and
the proceedings were conducted before a judicial tribunal." Addi-
tionally, the Court noted that the petitioner's counsel did not ap-
pear in any way to have been significantly limited in the scope or
nature of his cross-examination at the prior hearing.8 " In allowing
such testimony the Court stated "the right of cross-examination
80. Id at 159.
81. Id at 161-64. The Court cited Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400 (1965) (prior hearing
testimony of unavailable witness was not permitted where petitioner did not have adequate
opportunity to cross-examine); Barber v Page, 390 US 719 (1968) (State had not made a
good-faith effort to obtain the presence of an allegedly unavailable witness); Douglas v Ala-
bama, 380 US 415 (1965), (petitioner could not cross-examine accomplice concerning confes-
sion because accomplice refused to testify on self-incriminating grounds); and Bruton v
United States, 391 US 123 (1968) (violation of confrontation rights in the admission of co-
defendant's confession when co-defendant did not take the stand.) Id.
82. Id at 161.
83. Id at 158.
84. Id at 165.
85. Id. Compare the Court's observation in Barber v Page, 390 US 719 (1968):
The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the occasion for
the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a
much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because
its function is the more limited one of determining whether probably cause exists to
hold the accused for trial.
Barber, 390 US at 725.
86. Id at 166.
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then afforded provides substantial compliance with the purposes
behind the confrontation requirement, as long as the declarant's
inability to give live testimony is in no way the fault of the
state. '87 The Court additionally considered whether such testi-
mony should be restricted in light of the fact that the declarant
was available for cross-examination. 8 In rejecting such an argu-
ment the Court stated that as a constitutional matter it would be
untenable to construe the Confrontation Clause to permit the use
of prior testimony to prove a case where the declarant is unavaila-
ble, but to bar that testimony where the declarant is present at
trial."9
In its next term the Court, in Dutton v Evans,9 ° addressed the
issue of whether the petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights were vio-
lated when evidence was admitted against him under the co-con-
spirator hearsay exception. 1 The petitioner, tried for murder in
the State of Georgia,"2 alleged that his Sixth Amendment rights
were violated because the co-conspirator hearsay exception applied
by the State did not identically conform to the hearsay exception
applicable in federal courts. 3 The Court recognized, however, as it
did in Green,94 that merely because evidence is admitted in viola-
tion of an established hearsay rule does not automatically lead to
the conclusion that an individual's Confrontation Rights have been
violated.9 5 The Court reasoned that the limitations placed on the
federal co-conspirator hearsay exception were not required by the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause but rather were defined
by the Court in its exercise of its rule making power, arising out of
the Court's disfavor of the broadening net of conspiracy
prosecutions.9
For more than a decade after the decisions in Green and Dutton,
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id at 166-67.
90. 400 US 74 (1970). A plurality of four Justices was joined by Justice Harlan in
affirming the rejection of the accused's confrontation arguments.
91. Id at 79.
92. Evans v State, 222 Ga 392, 150 SE2d 240 (1966).
93. Dutton, 400 US at 80. Georgia's co-conspirator exception, unlike the federal co-
conspirator exception that only applies if a statement was made in the course or in further-
ance of the co-conspiracy, allows into evidence a co-conspirator's out-of-court statement
made during the concealment phase of the co-conspiracy, i.e., engaged in concealment of the
criminal enterprise. Id at 81.
94. See note 74.
95. 400 US at 81.
96. Id at 82.
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the Court made no further attempts to clarify the scope or mean-
ing of the Confrontation Clause. However, in 1980, the Court in
Ohio v Roberts9 7 once again addressed the issue of whether the use
of prior testimony from a preliminary hearing could be used
against the petitioner when the witness was shown to be unavaila-
ble. 8 Petitioner's counsel did not cross-examine the witness at the
preliminary hearing; the witness was, however, subject to defense
counsel's direct examination. 9 The Supreme Court of Ohio 00 ana-
lyzed that Green went no further than to suggest that cross-exami-
nation actually conducted at a preliminary hearing may afford ade-
quate confrontation for purposes of a later trial."' 1 The Supreme
Court of Ohio held the preliminary hearing testimony to be inad-
missible in that mere opportunity to cross-examine at a prelimi-
nary hearing did not afford constitutional confrontation for pur-
poses of trial.'0 2
In addressing the issue in this case the United States Supreme
Court began its analysis by pointing out that the Confrontation
Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial
that is secured primarily through the right of cross-examination.10 3
The Court then stated that the Confrontation Clause restricts the
scope of admissible hearsay in two ways: first, the Confrontation
Clause normally requires a showing that the witness is unavaila-
ble;' 0 ' and second, the witness's statement is only admissible if it
bears adequate indicia of reliability.1 05 It was the Court's opinion
97. 448 US 56 (1980).
98. Id at 58. Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2945.49 (Baldwin 1992) provides that:
Testimony taken at an examination or a preliminary hearing at which the defendant
is present, or at a former trial of the cause, or taken by deposition at the instance of
the defendant or the state, may be used whenever the witness giving such testimony
dies, or cannot for any reason be produced at trial or whenever the witness has, since
giving such testimony, become incapacitated to testify. If such former testimony is
contained within a bill of exceptions, or authenticated transcript of such testimony, it
shall be proven by the bill of exceptions, or transcript, otherwise by other testimony.
Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2945.49 (Baldwin 1992).
99. Id.
100. Ohio v Roberts, 55 Ohio St 2d 191, 378 NE2d 492 (1978) (citation omitted).
101. Roberts, 448 US at 62.
102. Id.
103. Id at 63.
104. Id at 65.
105. Id at 65. The Court noted that this principal was recently formulated in Mancusi
v Stubbs, 408 US 204 (1972), where it noted:
The focus of the Court's concern has been to insure that there are 'indicia of reliabil-
ity which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be
placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant' (citation
omitted), and to 'afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of
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that reliability can be inferred where evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception.' 06
Following these criteria the Court addressed the facts of the
case. Here, the Court was satisfied that the prosecution satisfied
the good faith standard required by the Confrontation Clause in
establishing unavailability of the witness.' The Court was of the
opinion that "the ultimate question is whether the witness is un-
available despite good-faith efforts undertaken prior to the trial to
locate and present the witness.'08 The Court was satisfied that this
requirement was met through the prosecution's issuance of five
separate subpoenas to produce the witness as well as other at-
tempts to personally locate the witness. 10 The Court also ex-
amined whether there was compliance with the reliability standard
and concluded that the defense counsel's interrogation of the wit-
ness at the preliminary hearing was equivalent to cross-examina-
tion;"10 it provided a basis to challenge whether the witness was
sincerely telling the truth and whether the witness accurately per-
ceived and remembered what he conveyed."' The broad language
used by the Court in this opinion would eventually lead to the
Court addressing the unavailability requirement, once again.
In 1986 the Court in United States v Inadi" 2 addressed the
question of whether the Confrontation Clause requires a showing
of unavailability before admission of a non-testifying co-conspira-
tor's out-of-court statements, even though those statements other-
wise satisfy the requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E)." 3 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,"" in-
terpreting Roberts, concluded that Roberts created a clear consti-
tutional rule requiring a showing of unavailability as a condition to
the prior statement' (citation omitted). It is clear from these statements, and from
numerous prior decisions of this Court, that even though the witness be unavailable
his prior testimony must bear some of these 'indicia of reliability'."
Id at 65-66, quoting Mancusi, 408 US at 213.
106. Roberts, 448 US at 66.
107. Id at 74-77.
108. Id at 74.
109. Id at 75.
110. Id at 68-72.
111. Id At 71, citing Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator
Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 Harv L Rev 1378 (1972).
112. 475 US 387 (1986).
113. Id at 388. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement is not
hearsay if it is offered against a party and is "a statement by a co-conspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." FRE 801(d)(2)(E)
114. United States v Inadi, 748 F2d 812 (1984), rev'd 475 US 387 (1986).
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admission of any out-of-court statements. " 5 The Supreme Court,
however, did not believe that Roberts stood for such a wholesale
revision of the law of evidence, noting that under the Third Cir-
cuit's interpretation no out-of-court statements would be admissi-
ble without a showing of unavailability.'
1 6
In addressing the issue before it, the Court, based on certain lim-
iting statements noted in the Roberts decision," 7 stated that Rob-
erts should be limited to the actual question before it: the consti-
tutionality of the introduction into evidence of the preliminary
hearing testimony of a witness not produced at the subsequent
trial.1 8 The Court then pointed out that the Court in Roberts
found in a long line of Confrontation Clause cases involving prior
testimony that before such statements can be admitted it must be
demonstrated that the declarant is unavailable."' Therefore, Rob-
erts "must be read consistently with the question it answered, the
authority it cited, and its own facts.'
20
In addressing why the Court did not believe the unavailability
rule was applicable to co-conspirator's out-of-court statements, the
Court reasoned that the considerations requiring a showing of un-
availability before the introduction of prior testimony are not ap-
plicable to co-conspirator statements.' 2 1 Unlike former testimony,
often only a weaker substitute for live testimony, a co-conspirators'
statements provide evidence of a co-conspiracy's context that can-
not be replicated even if the declarant testifies at trial. 22 Further-
more, co-conspirators' statements often derive their significance
from the circumstances in which they were made while in-court
testimony seldom will provide the evidencing value of statements
made during the course of the conspiracy. 23 Based on these fac-
tors, in addition to others, it was the Court's opinion that the ad-
mission of co-conspirators' statements into evidence actually fur-
thers the mission of the Confrontation Clause which is to advance
115. Inadi, 475 US at 391, citing United States v Inadi, 748 F2d 812 (1984)(citing
Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56 (1980)).
116. Inadi, 475 US at 392 (citations omitted).
117. See Inadi, 475 US at 392 (citations omitted).
118. Inadi, 475 US at 392-93.
119. Id at 393 (citations omitted). See Mancusi v Stubbs, 408 US 204 (1972); Califor-
nia v Green, 399 US 149 (1970); Barber v Page, 390 US 719 (1968); Berger v California, 393
US 314 (1969). Id.
120. Inadi, 475 US at 394.
121. Id.




the accuracy and truth-determining process in criminal trials.' 24
Additionally, the Court pointed out that the benefits derived from
the imposition of an unavailability rule would be slight while im-
posing substantial burdens on the entire criminal system; in those
cases involving co-conspirator statements the prosecution would be
required to identify with specificity each declarant, locate such de-
clarants, and ensure their continuing availability for trial.12 5 The
Court concluded by affirming the continued validity of the co-con-
spirator statements and declining "to require a showing of the de-
clarant's unavailability as a prerequisite to their admission." 2 '
Recently the Court, in Idaho v Wright, 2 7 addressed the issue of
whether the admission at trial of certain hearsay statements made
by a child to an examining pediatrician violates the petitioner's
Sixth Amendment rights.12 8 The hearsay statements were admitted
by the trial court under Idaho's residual hearsay exception.2 9 The
Supreme Court of Idaho,'30 however, held that the admission of
the hearsay testimony violated the petitioner's "constitutional
right to confrontation because the testimony did not fall within a
traditional hearsay exception."' 1 Passing on the question of
whether the child must be shown to be unavailable before her
statements are admissible, the Court believed that the crux of the
question presented in this case is whether the child's statements
124. Id at 396 (citations omitted).
125. Id at 396-400.
126. Id at 400.
127. - US -, 110 S Ct 3139 (1990).
128. Id at 3143.
129. Id at 3144. Idaho's residual hearsay exception provides in relevant part:
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.- The following
are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a
witness...
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
Court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interest of justice will best be served by .ad-
mission of the statement into evidence.
Wright, 110 S Ct at 3144-45, quoting Idaho Rule Evid 803(24).
130. Idaho v Wright, 116 Idaho 382, 775 P2d 1224 (1989).
131. Wright, 110 S Ct at 3145. The Supreme Court of Idaho reasoned that the hearsay
statements lacked trustworthiness because the pediatrician's interview with the child con-
sisted of leading questions and was performed by someone with a preconceived notion of
what the child should be disclosing. Id.
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bore sufficient indicia of reliability.13 2
In determining whether the requirement of indicia of reliability
has been met, the Court recognized that there are basically two
tests: where the hearsay statement falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, or where the statement is shown to be sup-
ported by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 133 The
hearsay exception in this case was not found to be firmly rooted for
Confrontation Clause purposes.1 34 Rather the Court recognized
that the residuary hearsay exception "accommodates ad hoc in-
stances in which statements ... might nevertheless be sufficiently
reliable to be admissible at trial. ' 13 6 However, the residuary excep-
tion does not share the same tradition of reliability supporting ad-
missibility of statements falling under firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tions.1 36 In determining whether a statement contains the
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness required for admission
under the Confrontation Clause, the Court believed that such
guarantees must be determined from "the totality of circumstances
that surround the making of the statement and that render the
declarant particularly worthy of belief." 3 ' Such statements would
be so "trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to its
reliability. 13 8 Based on these criteria the Court upheld the Su-
preme Court of Idaho's decision, concluding that the prosecution
had not shown that the statements were made under circum-
stances that contain particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.139
In White v Illinois 140 the United States Supreme Court once
again revisited the Confrontation Clause requirement of unavaila-
bility as it pertains to the introduction of out-of-court statements
into evidence. 1 The White Court appears to have decided to re-
examine this requirement in order to clarify the language it used in
its Roberts and Inadi opinions. The White Court recognized that
the language it used in the Roberts opinion might have suggested
that the "Confrontation Clause generally requires that a declarant
132. Id at 3147.
133. Id, citing Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56 (1980).
134. Wright, 110 S Ct at 3147.
135. Id.
136. Id at 3148.
137. Id at 3149.
138. Id.
139. Id at 3150.
140. - US - , 112 S Ct 736 (1992).
141. Id at 740-41.
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either be produced at trial or be found unavailable before his out-
of-court statements can be admitted .. .,,;1,2 however, the Court
believed this generalization to be negated by its holding in
Inadi.1"'
The Court in White reaffirmed it reasoning in Inadi where it
refused to extend an unavailability requirement to all out-of-court
statements.""' This reasoning recognized that certain statements
provide evidence that cannot be replicated even if the declarant
testifies at trial. ' 5 Furthermore, an unavailability rule would not
likely produce much additional meaningful testimony while impos-
ing "substantial additional burdens on the factfinding process. 14 6
Although the Court in Inadi expressed its opinion in relation to co-
conspirator statements, the Court in White recognized that such
statements were also applicable to the spontaneous declarations
and medical examination exceptions. 147 This conclusion is based on
the reasoning that it is the context in which the statements are
made that gives them their reliability.' The same factors which
give the statement its reliability cannot be duplicated merely by
having the declarant testify at trial.' 9 It would appear, based on
the Court's reasoning, that if the reliability of a statement arises
from the context in which the statement is made such that its
value could not be duplicated by later in-court testimony, then an
unavailability showing would not be required. A key factor in this
determination appears to be whether there is a "threat of lost evi-
dentiary value if the out-of-court statements were replaced with
live testimony".15°
Although the language in White appears to dispel any notion
that a general unavailability analysis is required of out-of-court
statements, such language does not appear consistent with the
Court's recent decision in Idaho v Wright. 5' In White the Court
states:
In Inadi we considered the admission of out-of-court statements made by a
142. Id at 741, citing Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56 (1980).
143. White, 112 S Ct at 741.
144. Id at 741-42 (citations omitted).
145. Id at 742.
146. Id.
147. Id at 742-43 (citations omitted).
148. Id at 742. The admission of out-of-court statements under the guise of hearsay
exception must be shown to contain sufficient indicia of reliability.
149. Id.
150. Id at 743.
151. - US -, 110 S Ct 3139 (1990).
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co-conspirator in the course of the conspiracy. As an initial matter, we re-
jected the proposition that Roberts established a rule that 'no out-of-court
statements would be admissible without a showing of unavailability' (cita-
tions omitted). To the contrary, rather than establishing 'a wholesale revi-
sion of the law of evidence' under the guise of the Confrontation Clause,
(citation omitted), we concluded that 'Roberts must be read consistently
with the question it answered, the authority it cited, and its own facts.' (ci-
tations omitted). So understood, Roberts stands for the proposition that un-
availability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry
only when the challenged out-of-court statements were made in the course
of a prior judicial proceeding. (citation omitted). 52
Compare this language to the Court's statements in Idaho v
Wright where the Court states:
In Ohio v Roberts, we set forth 'a general approach' for determining which
incriminating statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule
also meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. (citation omitted).
We noted that the Confrontation Clause 'operates in two separate ways to
restrict the range of admissible hearsay' (citation omitted). 'First, in con-
formance with the Framer's preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth
Amendment established a rule of necessity. In the usual case . . ., the pros-
ecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the de-
clarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.' (citation
omitted). Second, once a witness is shown to be unavailable, "his statement
is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability'. ..15
We have applied the general approach articulated in Roberts to subsequent
cases raising Confrontation Clause and hearsay issues ...54
Applying the Roberts approach to this case . 15.
Although Inadi and White stand for the proposition that the un-
availability requirement does not extend to all out-of-court state-
ments, such cases may be limited to include only those out-of-
court statements whose evidentiary value could not be duplicated
by later in-court testimony. Arguably, based on the language in
Roberts and Wright, a general showing of unavailability is still re-
quired although such a showing does not extend to all out-of-court
statements. For the time being, it appears that the Court will con-
tinue to address the requirement of unavailability on a case by
case basis.
Although the United States Supreme Court has avoided develop-
152. White, 112 S Ct at 741.
153. Idaho v Wright, 110 S Ct at 3146.
154. Id.
155. Id at 3147.
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ing a litmus test concerning the admissibility of certain hearsay
exception testimony, there are some generalizations that can be
made. First, a showing of unavailability is not required in all in-
stances. Where in-court testimony, subject to cross-examination, is
likely to add to the evidentiary value of such out-of-court state-
ments, a showing of unavailability will be required. However,
where the out-of-court statements gain their reliability from the
context in which they are spoken, a showing of unavailability will
most likely not be required because the factors which give the
statement its reliability cannot be duplicated merely by having the
declarant testify at trial. Secondly, the Confrontation Clause re-
quires that the out-of-court statements contain sufficient indicia of
reliability. This showing of indicia of reliability can be met where
the statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, or
where the statement is supported by particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. In determining whether a statement contains par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness, the Court will consider
the totality of circumstances that surround the making of the
statement to ascertain whether the declarant is particularly worthy
of belief.
John E. McGrady III
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